[SECURITY] DNAT'd host disclosure

[Horms]

On Fri, Feb 03, 2006 at 03:37:33PM +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
> Horms wrote:
> > I have been researching the vulnerability of various kernel versions to
> > CVE-2002-0704, which is explained from various angles at:
> > 
> >   http://www.netfilter.org/security/2002-04-02-icmp-dnat.html
> >   http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2002-086.html
> >   http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4699/discuss
> > 
> > In a nutshell, you can discover the internal IP address of a DNAT'd
> > host by manipulating the TTL of packets sent, such that the expire
> > between the DNATing and DNAT'd hosts.
> > 
> >   By DNATing host, I mean the machine that has the iptables DNAT rule
> >   By DNAT'd, I mean the host that the connection is directed to, which
> >   actually terminates the connection. So the packet path is:
> > 
> >   [end-user]----[some net]---[DNATing host]---[some more net]---[DNAT'd host]
> > 
> >   Sorry if this is confusing, I'm not sure what terms are usually used
> > 
> > I believe that this was resolved in 2.6.11 with the following patch
> > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git;a=commitdiff;h=1e69ba3fa29b13fe5229d6e325aee91ae5abe298
> 
> Yes, this one and the one to manually attach conntrack references to
> locally generated ICMP errors.

Thanks for confirmint that.

> > At the very least, 2.6.16-rc2 does not seem to exhibit this problem,
> > while I have been able to reproduce it using 2.4.18, 2.4.27, 2.4.33-pre1
> > and 2.6.8. (I can reverify individual versions if need be).
> > 
> > In the course of playing with this for far to long I believe that I have
> > discovered two related vulnerabilities. 
> > 
> > I. Disclosure of intermediate hop addresses
> > 
> > I believe that the following patch, also included in 2.6.11 causes the
> > IP address of intermediate hops between the DNATing and DNAT'd hosts to
> > be trivially disclosed, as illustrated by the following tcptraceroute.
> > 
> > http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git;a=commit;h=8d5f3377d48c74df38990688f09e773887ba4eb5
> > 
> > # tcptraceroute 10.0.1.7 80
> > Selected device ppp7, address 10.0.1.4, port 1942 for outgoing packets
> > Tracing the path to 10.0.1.7 on TCP port 80 (www), 30 hops max
> >  1  10.0.1.7  26.517 ms  25.262 ms  74.672 ms
> >  2  192.168.1.254  76.070 ms  75.554 ms  75.988 ms
> >  3  10.0.1.7 [open]  69.503 ms  114.771 ms  105.756 ms
> > 
> > The client now knows not only that 10.0.1.7 80 is DNAT'd but that
> > there is an intermediate hop with the address 192.168.1.254. Which
> > is similar to the disclosure made by CVE-2002-0704, where the IP
> > address of hop 3 can be revealed using hbping (but not tcptraceroute).
> > The intermediate hop information can also be revealed using hbping,
> > and likely a variety of other tools.
> > 
> > I have a rather hackish patch, against today's Linus tree (~2.6.16-rc2)
> > at the bottom of this message, which conceals the address, leading to
> > the following output.
> 
> I'm surprised, IIRC I've tested that it still behaves fine with Rusty's
> NAT changes. I'm going to try to reproduce this.

Let me know if you need me to run more tests. I'm pretty sure that
what I describe above is reproducable.

> > # tcptraceroute 10.0.1.7 80
> > Selected device ppp7, address 10.0.1.4, port 1952 for outgoing packets
> > Tracing the path to 10.0.1.7 on TCP port 80 (www), 30 hops max
> >  1  10.0.1.7  27.198 ms  72.374 ms  66.602 ms
> >  2  10.0.1.7  68.898 ms  76.121 ms  66.639 ms
> >  3  10.0.1.7 [open]  66.052 ms  107.855 ms  107.375 ms
> > 
> > 
> > II. DNAT use exposure
> > 
> > I believe that all versions of the DNAT code back to at least the
> > versions covered by CVE-2002-0704, and up to date allow TTL to be used
> > to ascertain if a port is DNAT'd. Looking at the original description of
> > CVE-2002-0704, and the two tcptracroutes above, it is easy to see that
> > the port has been DNAT'd. While the last trace does not disclose much
> > information, other than that DNAT is in use, and there are 2 hops after
> > the DNATing host, it is still unwanted disclosure. Imagine a user
> > whose ISP forbids the connection of networks, who is using DNAT (against
> > the ISP's policy), and the ISP runs a check like this.
> > 
> > I do not have a proposal to fix this problem. I'm actually not sure if
> > it is fixable. I would be interested to see what other DNAT
> > implementations do. And at the very least, I would like this message to
> > serve as documentation (or the start of documentation) of this problem.
> 
> Well, I'm not sure I agree that its a problem at all. NAT is not
> meant for anonymizing traffic. There are other ways of determining
> that NAT is used (timestamps, IP IDs, sequence numbers, ...).
> Anyway, changing this behaviour would require not decrementing the
> TTL for DNATed and forwarded packets, which means that you could
> create loops in which the packets TTL never expires. I don't think
> that this is a good idea.

Yes, I agree entirely.

-- 
Horms